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3 Laying the foundation
Before proceeding further, we need to put down a foundation for the
topics we will take up subsequently. We provide brief discussions of
several key ideas. These include culture, humans as meaning-makers,
and knowledge as socially and historically situated. What do we mean by
“culture” and what is its part in human psychology and social relations?
How are meaning-making and language part of human experience, social
relations, and cultural life? How is language related to culture, power,
and meaning-making?
Culture and human psychology
Culture is an inextricable part of mental life. Culture must be seen as an
inseparable part of people’s psychological functioning, not something
that can be added onto an individual. Seeing culture as in psychology has
several consequences for psychological practice and research. Through-
out this book, we describe many such consequences. In this section, we
describe concepts and terms that are central to the ways of thinking
about culture in psychology presented in this book. All of these ways
share the conviction that meaning is central to human psychology.
Moreover, meaning is unavoidably social; there could be no other kind
of meaning (Mishler, 1979). No matter how private or unique a person’s
experiences may feel, meanings are not wholly created in an individual’s
mind, nor determined by biological drives. As soon as one invokes
meaning, one has to begin to think about culture (Mattingly, 2008;
Mattingly et al., 2008). Meanings are based on a common or shared
framework and a shared language. Such a shared framework is necessary
if meanings are to be intelligible to others. Any psychological theorizing
about meaning necessarily must take culture as one of its starting points.
Connections between meaning systems in society and individual
psychology have been of interest throughout the history of psychology,
although that interest has ebbed and flowed. Psychologists have thought
about these connections in different ways. Some have simply carried out
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studies comparing people in one country to those in another, presuming
that everyone who lived in a particular locale shared the same meaning
system. Other psychologists have imported anthropological concepts
and methods, which are geared to the study of culture, into their
research. Others have redefined the relation between individual and
society such that their research questions explicitly take culture into
account (Kirschner and Martin, 2010; Rogoff, 2003). It is the latter two
types of psychological theory and research that we take up in this book.
Defining culture
There are few terms in the social sciences that have been given so many,
and such diverse, meanings as “culture.” As we view it, culture is one
of the conditions necessary for there to be such things as “persons” or
“humans” or “humanity.” Yet this condition is something that humans
themselves produce. The cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz has
expressed this recursivity in the following quotation: “Believing . . . that
man1 is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has
spun, I take culture to be those webs” (1973, p. 4). Because Geertz’s
thinking about culture has inspired many others, we look more closely at
his statement.
The phrase “man is an animal” shows an appreciation of the import-
ance of biology to human existence; it acknowledges that humans have
much in common with other animals. The definition of culture as “webs
of significance” calls forth an image of a complex and multidimensional
network of local and global meanings that intersect and influence one
another in a person’s daily life. Humans, that is, humanity as well as
individuals, are constantly suspended in these webs. This is what defines
a person as human. There is no way of being outside culture and still
being human. Humans are defined as humans by the webs of significance:
A human animal without such a support system would not be human.
The image of individuals suspended in a culture as if in a web could
be taken to imply that culture is outside individuals. However, as Geertz
points out, it is humans themselves who have spun these webs of signifi-
cance; thus, the webs are not outside at all. There is a fundamental
recursivity of “culture” and “humans.” Each is needed for the other to
exist. Culture cannot exist without human beings and human beings
cannot exist without culture. Culture at its very heart is something
intrinsically human, and humans are intrinsically cultural beings.
1
Today’s readers will find it objectionable to use the word man to denote all of humanity.
However, in 1973, when Geertz wrote this definition, this was still common usage.
20 Laying the foundation
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139086318.004
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 14 Oct 2019 at 17:52:47, subject to the Cambridge Core
Culture, then, can be seen as a web or universe of meanings that
orders and gives shape to people’s experiences and reality as humans.
Culture makes experiences knowable in some ways but not in other
ways. But culture is a set of meanings that humans themselves have
created and continually re-create. Humans both perpetuate traditions
and meanings and remake and change them. In order to fashion a
personal identity and relate to one another, humans use the toolbox of
possible meanings that culture provides (Haavind, 2002). Thus, cultur-
ally based interpretations of a certain action contribute greatly to the
personal meaning of the action (Bruner, 1990; Geertz, 1973).
People as meaning-makers
Psychologists studying individuals in culture have a primary interest
in meaning-making, particularly as it is part of everyday activity and as
it is constituted by culture and cultural processes (Rogoff, 2003).
People’s meaning-making – both in communicating with others and in
making their experiences intelligible to themselves – always draws upon
sets of meanings that already exist. Therefore, to study meaning-making,
psychologists must locate the individuals whom they study in culture.
To speak of mental life – that is, meaning – we need to begin with
culture, not with the notion of an individual standing in isolation from
the social surround (Bruner, 1990; Mattingly et al., 2008). Indeed, there
is no such individual.
Ordinariness, deviations, and narrative
If culture is central to individual psychological functioning, how does
culture shape mind? This is not a simple question and there have been
many attempts to answer it. Let us follow the cultural psychologist
Jerome Bruner through his recent discussion of the question. Bruner
(2008) begins with an assumption that seems fairly easy to accept: To
be a member of a particular culture means that one shares with the other
members of that culture a number of ideas about what is ordinary and
unexceptional. These ideas are supported by social institutions such as
the family, the educational system, and religion, as well as by language
and other shared communication tools. Such supports are of course
“outside” each individual.
The sense of shared ordinariness among members of a social group is
an experience that people find highly rewarding. It supports the uniquely
human capacity for mutual understanding, which is a major part of what
most people feel defines them as humans. Moreover, because the sense
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of shared ordinariness is so satisfying, breaches are discomfiting; they
must be repaired. Daily life, of course, is not completely predictable.
Social groups therefore need some means of handling departures from
shared ordinariness; that is, instances when shared modes of thinking are
not adequate to account for events and actions. Such “cracks” in the
ordinary need to be made understandable, either by finding ways to
accommodate them within existing modes of thinking or by finding ways
to explain why one is not able to or willing to accommodate them.
One of the most common means for representing deviations is
narrative. People tell stories about experiences that have created fissures
in shared ordinariness. In these stories, cultural resources necessarily
serve as both the framework and content. Narratives repair the fissures
by using cultural conventions that make deviations understandable.
Put another way, when members of a social group are confronted with
an unintelligible or threatening event, they jointly devise a meaning
that makes the event understandable. In Bruner’s view of culture and
psychology, culture is present in individual minds “through the conven-
tionalization of experience into shared ordinariness, a conventionaliza-
tion that makes place as well for rendering deviations from shared
ordinariness into a comprehensible and manageable form” (Bruner,
2008, p. 35).
Cultural psychology
Psychologists who espouse ideas such as the ones we have just presented
share a view that humans are active agents in their own lives. People
make plans, develop intentions, and embrace values that they live out in
the courses of action they choose. Cultural psychologists such as these
are interested in people’s own reasons for their actions, rather than
developing causal explanations for certain behaviors. These psychologists
see people’s identities as constructed through narratives and narrating.
Cultural psychologists also view humans as meaning-makers able to
move flexibly among existing cultural conventions and resources. They
also emphasize that people are always members of more than one social
group. People move among different sets of cultural meanings when
making meaning and narrating.
Cultural psychology is not a homogeneous field. Different theorists
emphasize different aspects of the processes we have just described. We
introduce the ideas of a number of cultural psychologists in several of
the chapters that follow. For further reading about cultural psychology,
we recommend the following texts: The cultural nature of human develop-
ment by Barbara Rogoff (2003); The sociocultural turn in psychology,
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edited by Suzanne Kirschner and Jack Martin (2010); Thinking through
cultures: expeditions in cultural psychology by Richard Shweder (1991); Acts
of meaning by Jerome Bruner (1990); and Cultural psychology: a once and
future discipline by Michael Cole (1996).
Who holds the power over meanings?
Does “power” belong in psychology? Yes. For psychologists interested in
gender and culture, and perhaps for feminists in particular, addressing
power is necessary. No matter what their approach, researchers need to
take into account how those whom they study are situated in larger
social systems that are suffused with power. If psychology is to formu-
late usable theories and effective therapeutic practices, power must be
taken into account (E. Cole, 2009; Fox et al., 2009; Goodwin and
Fiske, 2001). Power issues – specifically, psychological aspects of power
relations – are often discussed in the chapters that follow. In this section,
we lay the groundwork for those discussions.
When people use the word power in everyday conversation, they
usually refer to a force belonging to, or localized in, a certain person,
group, or institution or in the state. In this usage, those who own power
can direct their power against others who do not own power or who own
less power. They can either force others to do something against their
will or prevent them from doing something that they want to do. When
one thinks about power in this way, an important task is to identify who
owns the power. Another question is whether or not that ownership is
legitimate. If not, it can be contested. For example, the state usually
restricts the power to punish wrongdoers to the criminal justice system.
Ordinary citizens may retaliate against another person for committing a
crime, but they are not wielding legitimate power when they do so. Such
“power-over” may be at stake in daily life, as when one person commits a
violent act against another person, or one spouse restricts the other
spouse to the confines of the household.
Often issues of power are not as easily deciphered as in the cases noted
above. In daily life, it is not always clear who is the legitimate owner of
power in a particular situation. Similarly, it is often not clear whether
any power has been exercised, even though some people may be behav-
ing as if it had been. Think, for instance, of how people may voluntarily
engage in practices that appear self-injurious or self-defeating. If people
are overtly forced to behave this way, it seems easy to say that they were
subjected to power. But, if people seem to behave this way voluntarily,
are they subjected to power? If we limit ourselves to power-over, or
coercive power, it may not seem so. However, there are other kinds of
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power besides coercive power. Here, we examine some of the ways that
scholars have conceptualized different kinds of power.
Dimensions of power
Many social scientists interested in power have adopted the tripartite
definition offered by Steven Lukes (1974). Lukes, a political theorist,
identified three dimensions of power.
The first dimension of power concerns the ability to make decisions
that affect others even if those others object. Such power is often lodged in
formal institutions such as the police, the military, psychiatric hospitals,
or child welfare agencies. Parents of young children have such power over
many aspects of their children’s daily lives.
The second dimension of power is the ability to “set the agenda”; that is,
to determine what can be talked about in public arenas and private
life and what ways of talking about a topic are permissible. Power of
this kind operates through both formal institutions and informal social
processes. One of the consequences of agenda-setting power is that
some topics or issues are never brought up for consideration. Power to set
the agenda operates via influence, inducement, persuasion, and manipula-
tion, as well as via direct coercion and force. State censorship is an
example of the latter.
The third dimension of power, ideological power, is the power to
shape people’s ways of seeing the world, their meanings and interpret-
ations, preferences and wishes. This power dimension is typically less
readily discernible than the first two. It is typical of ideologies that
they remain invisible; that is, people are unaware of them as ideologies.
Because of the invisibility of ideology, ideologies are often experienced
as “the way things are” and thus do not have to be explicitly invoked.
Ideological power can lead people to embrace stances that are detrimen-
tal to their well-being or position in society. An example is the ideological
power that leads many women to support laws and customs that
discriminate against women as a group.
Power and knowledge
Michel Foucault, a French historian of science and philosopher, put
forward another influential theory of power at around the same time as
Lukes was writing. Foucault, who originally studied psychology, was by
his own account particularly interested in how societies through the
course of history have induced people to regard themselves as certain
kinds of human beings (Foucault, 1983). Inevitably, power issues and
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the relations among power, knowledge, and identity (or subjectivity,
as Foucault preferred to call it) became important parts of his study
(Foucault, 1965/1988, 1975/1991, 1979, 1986). Many psychologists
who are interested in identity and power, along with the vicissitudes of
how people develop knowledge about themselves, have been inspired by
his writings.
The word “subject,” as Foucault used it, has a double meaning. First,
it means being a subject in the sense of “tied to one’s own identity by
a conscience or self-knowledge.” Second, it means being subjected to
someone else’s control (Foucault, 1983, p. 212). For Foucault, the
inextricable connection between being a subject and being subjected
to external control is the central issue to be explored and understood.
How do state power and social power work to form self-knowledge?
For Foucault, studying the operations of power required new scholarly
tools. Foucault therefore developed a number of analytical concepts.
He argued, for instance, that, in contemporary societies, certain kinds
of knowledge (but not other kinds) about oneself are made available to
individuals and made to seem necessary. This knowledge, according
to Foucault, is intrinsic to the ability of modern states to govern their
subjects without recourse to direct physical coercion. In this view, power
exercised by the state in modern societies is not so much about coercing
or prohibiting certain behaviors (though it sometimes is) but about
enabling and guiding certain desires and forms of conduct.
Free individuals within governed collectivities
By inviting and guiding individuals to want certain outcomes, modern
states exert “totalization power” without seeming to do so (Foucault,
1983, p. 221). As Foucault pointed out, no one explicitly forbids indi-
viduals to go against the grain, but everyday life is shaped in such a way
that going with the grain appears to be the best option or even the
only one. Even more, individuals experience that option as their chosen
option; that is, as a choice that expresses their own personality and
personal preferences. Even when nearly everybody in a group makes
the identical choice, it still feels like a matter of personal will and
preference. Parents who have observed their fifteen-year-olds being
rebellious and expressing their own personalities by wearing clothes that
are identical to the clothes of every other fifteen-year-old in the commu-
nity may appreciate these arguments. This simultaneous individuality
and conformity (or totalization) is what Foucault meant by “totalizing
power.” He saw it as the political genius of modern societies, because
power operates on individuals but remains invisible to them, leading
people to embrace their subjection as freedom.
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Normalization processes and disciplinary power
Foucault’s concept of normalization is of special interest to psycholo-
gists. Normalization refers to the processes by which a particular way
of life (or a way of being a person) comes to feel natural: as the way, with
all other ways seeming deviant. This way of being becomes a source
of pride, self-worth, and pleasure; it is experienced as self-fulfilling.
Normalization takes place through what Foucault called disciplinary
power. This term points specifically to the power of “the ordinary”
(or the taken-for-granted) to discipline individuals (Foucault, 1975/
1991; Gavey, 2005). Such disciplinary power operates through social
institutions such as education, medicine, work, law, marriage, and reli-
gion, as well as through the social institutions of the mental health
professions (Rose, 1989, 1996).
In modern societies, disciplinary power has become less open and
explicit. Increasingly, it has come to involve self-surveillance and volun-
tary conformity. Today disciplinary power often takes the guise of guide-
lines for how people ought to live, guidelines that promise fulfillment,
authentic living, happiness, and mental health. When we consider this
kind of power, it is not surprising that people willingly seek to comply
with such standards. This points to an important aspect of disciplinary
power. It is not only constraining or restrictive; it is also productive. That
is, it produces desires: meanings, practices, and identities that people
want to embrace.
Power/knowledge and self-regulation
Normalization and disciplinary power work through knowledge. For
instance, in a particular society, only certain kinds of knowledge about
what it means to be a human being are made available. This knowledge
seems sufficient, right, true, and morally correct. Its exact content
varies over time and between cultures. When people take up such
right knowledge, it comes to seem natural to them to want to align
themselves with its prescriptions. The ensuing self-regulation and self-
surveillance are, according to Foucault, distinctive features of modern
life (Foucault, 1980).
Foucault’s work has had a profound influence on scholarship in the
humanities and social sciences for several years. Foucault’s thinking,
which is multifaceted and much debated, has been interpreted in
many ways. Among psychologists who have made use of Foucauldian
thought are discursive psychologists such as Margaret Wetherell, post-
structural psychologists such as Nicola Gavey, and narrative therapists
such as Michael White and Stephen Madigan. Drawing on various
facets of Foucault’s work, they have studied justifications for “soft”
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racism (Wetherell and Potter, 1992), the cultural scaffolding of rape
(Gavey, 2005), and practices of social control that produce personal
distress and dysfunction (White, 2007). We explore the research pro-
grams of some of these writers in later chapters.
Knowledge as social artifact
In 1966, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann published The social
construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge. They argued
that what people regard as real depends largely on social consensus
rather than on empirical validity. In their view, knowledge is a social
product. Berger and Luckmann’s work was part of a long line of philo-
sophical inquiry into both the nature of reality and the processes by
which people know reality. They wrote at a time when these issues
generated intense debate among scholars. As sociologists (rather than
philosophers or natural scientists), Berger and Luckmann were not
concerned with the ultimate nature of reality, but rather with the social
processes by which knowledge about what is real is developed, warranted
as true, and maintained over time.
The social construction of reality presaged subsequent developments in
the sociology of knowledge, feminist theory, ethnomethodology, social
constructionism, post-structural thought, and discursive psychology.
Most generally, these diverse lines of thought share two broad goals:
first, to show that taken-for-granted concepts in everyday life and
scientific thinking are contingent on the events and circumstances of
their time and place; and, second, to examine in close detail the social
and cultural processes by which knowledge is formed and views of the
world are produced and naturalized.
What does it mean to say that knowledge is a social artifact? It means
that it is not possible to achieve objective knowledge about the world, in
the sense of reading off facts directly from the world. People’s observa-
tions of the world do not simply mirror what is “out there.” They are
always re-presentations in which language plays a central role. Multiple
re-presentations are possible because people have broad repertoires of
linguistic expressions to draw on. People’s linguistic and conceptual
categories determine what they know about the world. These concepts
and categories are not inherent in the nature of things; they are prod-
ucts of exchanges between people. Furthermore, people’s knowledge of
the world is not disinterested; it is laden with cultural, moral, political,
and emotional meanings. Knowledge is the outcome of negotiation on
both interpersonal and cultural levels. There are often disagreements
about what is to be accepted as knowledge and about which categories
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and constructs are valid (Hacking, 1995). Moreover, negotiations
about such matters are often carried out in circumstances of inequality.
Constructionism in psychology
The term social constructionism was introduced into academic psych-
ology in the mid-1980s (Gergen, 1985). Psychologists have continued
to pursue constructionist ideas and their applications to social research,
to methodological critique in psychology, and to psychotherapy.
A number of feminists in psychology, as well as psychologists interested
in sexualities, have taken up the idea that what we take to be reality
is a product of social negotiation (Bohan, 1993; Bohan and Russell,
1999; Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988; Marecek et al., 2004; Unger,
1989). Very often, feminist psychologists have been interested in using
the analytic lens of social construction both for social critique and
for critical scrutiny of psychological knowledge and practice. Within
conventional psychology, theories have often been built on the notion
of a solitary, bounded individual who stands apart from the social
and cultural surround. Constructionist theories of gender move
beyond that notion and instead embed the individual fully in ongoing
social life.
Before we describe constructionist perspectives in feminist psychology,
we take a moment to sketch a bit of background. For many psychologists,
concepts such as roles and socialization have seemed adequate to
account for gendered patterns of behavior. Others have found these
concepts to be insufficient. For example, they found that the construct
of “role” (as in “sex role” or “gender role”) was too specific and too
limited to capture the pervasiveness of gender imperatives and the mul-
tiple ways of enacting them. Moreover, the notion of a sex role originated
in theories that advocated complementary male–female roles as a means
to achieve harmonious marriages. “Role,” therefore, did not easily lend
itself to theorizing inequality, power, and subordination. Speaking in
terms of roles served to depoliticize gender and conceal male–female
hierarchy. Neither “role” nor the related concept “norm” could be used
analytically to account for women’s and men’s social condition, critics
argued. Roles and norms needed to be explained by the aid of other
concepts (Holter, 1992).
Some feminist researchers also objected to the idea that gendered
behavior is a matter of socialization. The idea that gendered behaviors
are a matter of training seemed to place too much emphasis on early
learning. In fact, few behaviors learned in childhood carry directly into
adulthood. Moreover, these researchers criticized socialization theorists
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for setting their sights on small slices of social life (families or play-
groups, for example) without taking the larger societal and cultural
context into account.
Both role theory and socialization theory were criticized for often
portraying people as robots who had no recourse but to conform to
social imperatives. This picture did not square with observations of
everyday life in which improvisation, irony, and subversion occur along-
side conformity. Moreover, role theory and socialization theory could
not account for the life experiences of many – including many gender
scholars – who willfully flouted at least some gender conventions and
openly rebelled against normative expectations. Many scholars who
sought to theorize psychological gender therefore abandoned these ways
of thinking and embraced constructionist ideas instead. Of particular
importance, these ideas offered a way to bring societal and cultural
patterns into theorizing about individual psychology. We discuss these
lines of thinking in Chapter 7.
Making language an object of study
Language shapes thinking; that is, language does not simply reflect inner
mental activity. Language enables and limits what these inner activities
can be. Language is not just “about” things in the world, but it also sets
the frame for how these things can be understood (Wetherell et al.,
2001). This means that language is far from neutral. Language practices
are always situated within societal and cultural fields; to a great extent,
these determine the possible meanings of what is said. Local meanings
are always bound up with larger social processes.
There is a field of psychology, discursive psychology, that focuses on
language as a social and cultural activity. Some discursive psychologists
study the dynamics of conversations and other spoken discourse. Others
scrutinize texts of interviews or conversations in order to trace the impact
of cultural presuppositions. In Chapter 7, we describe the principal goals
and methods of discursive psychology. In subsequent chapters, we dis-
cuss several research programs that have drawn on the ideas and
methods of discursive psychology.
The historical and cultural specificity of knowledge
If knowledge is a product of ongoing social negotiation, then it is specific
to its historical and cultural setting. What is accepted as true here and
today may not be accepted as true in another place and time. This is
especially true for knowledge about the social world. In other words, the
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durability and the truth status of a certain piece of knowledge (including
a psychological theory or concept) are determined not solely by its
empirical validity but also by a number of social processes. These
processes need to be scrutinized in both historical and psychological
terms (Smith, 2007). An example of such scrutiny is feminists’ scrutiny
of the male-centered worldview that prevailed through much of the
history of psychology. That worldview, along with a tacit acceptance
of the subordination of women as natural, led to an array of biased
scientific claims about women’s nature (Chesler, 1972; Horney, 1967;
Weisstein, 1971; Woolley, 1910). Feminists argued that this knowledge
was more a reaffirmation of stereotypes than a depiction of the experi-
ences of women.
Social artifacts are not ephemeral or easily changed. Those who argue
that knowledge and meanings are social products do not argue that
knowledge and meanings are malleable or easy to change. Far from it.
Indeed, once concepts congeal as truths and acquire the weight of social
consensus, they often are impregnable. Once in place, knowledge and
meanings create conditions for social action and interaction. One
example is how shibboleths about femininity and masculinity have influ-
enced interpretations of biological research data. Anne Fausto-Sterling
(2000a) has pointed out how scientific observations and ideas about
bodily processes are filtered through cultural notions about gender.
Meanings of masculinity and femininity almost inevitably influence
what it is possible for both laypeople and experts to see and say about
“biology” and the bodily processes concerned with sexuality.
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